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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the set of opinions that came to be known as the Patriation 
Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that “many Canadians 
would perhaps be surprised to learn that important parts of the 
constitution of Canada, with which they are the most familiar because 
they are directly involved when they exercise their right to vote at federal 
and provincial elections, are nowhere to be found in the law of the 
constitution”.1 These “important parts of the constitution” are 
constitutional conventions. Despite its belief that conventions do not 
belong to the realm of law, the Supreme Court has pronounced on a 
number of claims involving them, both before and since the Patriation 
Reference. This jurisprudence deserves attention, and criticism ― which 
indeed it has not failed to attract. 
The doctrine that conventions are not legal rules, and perhaps the 
very idea of constitutional conventions, entered the constitutional 
lawyers’ belief system thanks to A.V. Dicey’s magnum opus, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution.2 Conventions, as 
Dicey explained, are “understandings, habits, or practices which … 
regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, of 
the Ministry, or other officials”.3 Indeed, they are not mere 
understandings or habits, but rules, understood to be binding by those to 
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1  Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 
876-77 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”]. 
2  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1915). 
3  Id.; see also W.S. Holdsworth, “The Conventions of the Eighteenth Century 
Constitution” (1932) 17 Iowa L.R. 161, at 162 (“conventional rules spring up to regulate the working 
of the various parts of the constitution, their relations to one another, and to the subject”). 
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whom they apply. Generally speaking, conventions dictate that political 
actors or institutions must exercise the discretion that they would 
otherwise enjoy in a certain way, or within certain parameters. For 
example, with a few exceptions, the Crown exercises its prerogative 
powers in accordance with the advice of its responsible ministers; the 
ministers must resign or advise the Crown to dissolve Parliament if they 
lose a vote of confidence in the House of Commons; and so on.4  
The actors’ discretion must be limited in accordance with 
conventions to ensure, in Holdsworth’s words, that it is always exercised 
“in accordance with the prevailing constitutional theory of the time”.5  
A breach of conventions means nothing less than that some political 
actor is acting contrary to fundamental constitutional principle. As the 
Supreme Court put it in the Patriation Reference, a fundamental breach 
of convention “could be regarded as tantamount to a coup d’état”.6 In 
Eugene Forsey’s words, “conventions are the sinews and nerves of our 
body politic.”7 If they were severed, the body would be paralyzed. 
Yet important as they are, conventions are not, on Dicey’s theory, 
part of constitutional law. Dicey divided the constitution, understood as 
the set of “rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or 
exercise of the sovereign power in the state”8 into two subsets “of a 
totally distinct character”.9 Constitutional law, whether enacted or 
common law, and whether entrenched or susceptible of amendment by 
ordinary legislation, is one of them. Conventions make up the other. The 
rules of constitutional law, Dicey wrote, are judicially enforceable. By 
contrast, constitutional conventions “are not in reality laws at all since 
they are not enforced by the courts”,10 no matter how crucial they are for 
the operation of the constitution as we know it. 
The Supreme Court embraced Dicey’s view in the Patriation 
Reference, stating that “constitutional conventions plus constitutional law 
equal the total constitution of the country”.11 Although, in the wake of 
                                                                                                                                  
4  For a comprehensive study of Canadian constitutional conventions, see Andrew Heard, 
Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) [hereinafter “Heard, Conventions”]. 
5  Holdsworth, supra, note 3, at 163. 
6  Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 882. 
7  Eugene A. Forsey, “The Courts and The Conventions of The Constitution” (1984) 33 
U.N.B.L.J. 11 [hereinafter “Forsey”]. 
8  Dicey, supra, note 2, at 22. 
9  Id., at 23. 
10  Id. 
11  Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 884-85. 
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the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reference re Senate Reform,12 it is now 
doubtful whether this dichotomy accurately describes Canadian law, an 
exploration of that issue must be postponed due to lack of space.13 For 
the same reason, it is impossible to cover here any of the lower-court 
cases dealing with conventions, real or alleged. I must content myself 
with setting out in Part II, the Supreme Court’s views on conventions 
prior to the Senate Reform Reference, as well as the scholarly response to 
this jurisprudence in Part III. In the concluding Part IV, I will argue that 
the Court’s embrace of the distinction between law and convention was 
and remains misguided. 
II. CONVENTIONS AT THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court’s first engagement with constitutional conventions 
came in the set of references dealing with the constitutionality of legislation 
by which Parliament sought to implement the “labour conventions” 
concluded as part of the Treaty of Versailles.14 One of the arguments 
against the validity of this legislation was that Canada could not have 
entered into the international agreements which it implemented because 
“in point of legal rule, as distinct from constitutional convention, the 
Governor General in Council had no authority to become party by 
ratification to the convention with which we are concerned”.15 Chief 
Justice Duff, speaking for three of the six judges of the Supreme Court, 
rejected this contention. In his view, “constitutional usage”, evidenced in 
this instance by the proceedings of Imperial Conferences, could acquire 
the force of law, and although “[a]s a rule, the crystallization of 
constitutional usage into a rule of constitutional law to which the Courts 
will give effect is a slow process extending over a long period of time; … 
the Great War accelerated the pace of development in the region with 
                                                                                                                                  
12  [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.). 
13  In a nutshell, it seems to me that the notion of an “architecture” that is part of the 
judicially enforceable law of the constitution, which the Court invoked there, embraces at least 
some, although perhaps not all, conventions. 
14  Reference re Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, [1936] S.C.J. No. 31, [1936] 
S.C.R. 461 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Labour Conventions S.C.C.”]; see Fabien Gélinas, “Les 
conventions, le droit et la Constitution du Canada dans le renvoi sur la ‘sécession’ du Québec :  
le fantôme du rapatriement” (1997) 57:2 R du B du Québec 291, at 303-307 for a discussion of Duff 
C.J.C.’s treatment of conventions, and the Supreme Court’s mischaracterization of his opinions in 
the Patriation Reference [hereinafter “Gélinas, ‘Fantôme’”]. 
15  Labour Conventions S.C.C., id., at 476. 
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which we are concerned”.16 As a result, the extent of the prerogative 
powers of the federal Crown, and indeed the very existence of a 
Canadian Crown, distinct from the Imperial one, both legal issues, could 
be answered only with reference to “constitutional usage” or convention. 
Indeed, in Fabien Gélinas’s words, “for the Chief Justice, a constitutional 
convention morphed into a common law rule, with the common law now 
providing that in Canada the prerogative of making treaties … belongs to 
the Governor-General in Council”.17 Although the Privy Council differed 
from Duff C.J.C. in its views on the legislative competence of Parliament 
to implement the labour conventions,18 it did not reverse his conclusion 
as to the Canadian executive’s power to enter into them. 
The Supreme Court and Duff C.J.C. returned to the issue of 
conventions a short time thereafter, when dealing with the controversy 
over the disallowance of key planks of Alberta’s Social Credit 
government’s legislative program by the federal government.19 Alberta 
had argued that the powers which the Constitution Act 186720 grants 
provincial Lieutenants General of reserving a bill passed by the 
legislature for the signification of the Governor General’s pleasure, and 
the Governor General of disallowing provincial legislation,21 were no 
longer extant. In substance, although not in form, the basis for this claim 
was what was arguably an emerging convention preventing federal 
interference in the provincial legislative process.  
Here, however, Duff C.J.C., insisted that he was “not concerned with 
constitutional usage”, but only “with questions of law which … must be 
determined by reference to the enactments” of the imperial Parliament 
(such as the Constitution Act 1867) and of the Canadian one, if 
relevant.22 This position is seemingly at odds with that which the Chief 
Justice had taken in Labour Conventions S.C.C.,23 and indeed neither he 
                                                                                                                                  
16  Id., at 477. 
17  Gélinas, “Fantôme”, supra, note 14, at 306 (Author translation). 
18  Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ontario (Attorney-General), [1937] J.C.J. No. 5, [1937] 
A.C. 326 (J.C.P.C.). 
19  Reference re The Power of the Governor General in Council to Disallow Provincial 
Legislation and the Power of Reservation of a Lieutenant-Governor of a Province, [1938] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[1938] S.C.R. 71, at 73 (S.C.C.) (headnote explaining the factual background of the reference) 
[hereinafter “Disallowance Reference”]. 
20  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
21  Id., ss. 55-57 and 90. 
22  Disallowance Reference, supra, note 19, at 78. 
23  But see Gélinas, “Fantôme”, supra, note 14, at 308 (arguing that there is no contradiction 
between opining, in Labour Conventions S.C.C. that a convention could crystallize into law, and in 
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nor any of his colleagues so much as mention that opinion. Of course, the 
issue before the Supreme Court might appear to have been more difficult 
than in Labour Conventions S.C.C., which concerned the evolution of 
common law rules about the Crown. In the Disallowance Reference, by 
contrast, the Court was invited to recognize a convention that 
contradicted the clear terms of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, this 
is only so on the assumption that the references to the Crown in the 
Constitution Act, 186724 were capable of judicial re-interpretation, from 
the unified imperial Crown to a separate Canadian one. This is at least 
arguably contrary to the more originalist interpretive approach that 
prevailed at the time.25 
Be that as it may, here the Chief Justice concluded that as no 
legislation had modified the provisions of the Constitution Act 1867 
which granted them, “the power of disallowance and the power of 
reservation are both subsisting”.26 The other judges reached the same 
conclusion. The Chief Justice’s repeated disclaimers of “concern[] with 
constitutional usage or constitutional practice”27 hint that he was well 
aware that the Court’s opinion went against such practice. Justice 
Cannon’s insistence, in a somewhat surprising obiter dictum, that “[a]n 
additional reason for the preservation of this power of disallowance of 
provincial statutes is its necessity, more than ever evident, in order to 
safeguard the unity of the nation”28 suggests that he understood how 
uneasily the power sat with the federal principle. But the Court behaved 
just as Dicey believed it ought to, confining itself to applying the 
orthodox legal sources and ignoring convention.  
After a lengthy hiatus, the Supreme Court returned to the subject of 
conventions in the Patriation Reference, having been asked for an 
opinion on the twin questions of whether the federal government’s 
attempt to secure the Patriation of the Constitution and the entrenchment 
                                                                                                             
the Disallowance Reference, that the Court was not to consider the existence of an alleged 
convention). 
24  See especially Constitution Act, 1867, s. 9 (providing that “[t]he Executive Government 
and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen”). 
25  See e.g., Aeronautics Reference, [1931] J.C.J. No. 4, [1932] A.C. 54, at 70 (J.C.P.C.) 
(stating that “[t]he process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or to 
whittle down the provisions of the original contract upon which the federation was founded”); see 
also Léonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” (2017) 49 U.B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (discussing this and other cases). 
26  Disallowance Reference, supra, note 19, at 79. 
27  Id., at 78. 
28  Id., at 83. 
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of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms29 unilaterally, without 
provincial assent, was unconstitutional as a matter of law and of convention. 
Differently constituted but overlapping majorities,30 answered the legal 
question in the negative, and the conventional one in the affirmative. 
The answer to the legal question was orthodox enough. The majority 
rejected the contention “that a convention may crystallize into law”31 and 
thus become a fit subject for judicial enforcement. It echoed Dicey by 
insisting that there was a sharp distinction between rules of law, and in 
particular those of the common law, and convention. The former, the 
majority said “are the product of judicial effort, based on justiciable 
issues which have attained legal formulation and are subject to 
modification and even reversal by the courts which gave them birth”.32 
The latter, by contrast, are “political in inception” and thus by their “very 
nature” incapable of “legal enforcement”.33 There can be no “common 
law of constitutional law, but originating in political practice”, because 
“[w]hat is desirable as a political limitation does not translate into a legal 
limitation, without expression in imperative constitutional text or 
statute.”34 To hold otherwise would have meant to “enact by what would 
be judicial legislation” a formula for amending the Constitution; or 
perhaps “to say retroactively that in law we have had an amending 
formula all along, even if we have not hitherto known it”.35 There is, in 
the majority opinion, perhaps only one sign that constitutional thought 
had moved on from the Disallowance Reference. “[R]eservation and 
disallowance of provincial legislation,” the majority noted, “although in 
law still open, have, to all intents and purposes, fallen into disuse.”36 This 
is an observation about “constitutional usage” that Duff C.J.C. and his 
colleagues would not make; a small departure from orthodoxy, perhaps, 
but a revealing one. 
The Court’s answer to the conventional question was not orthodox ― 
in that it was given at all. The majority opinion on the legal question  
 
                                                                                                                                  
29  The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
30  Chief Justice Laskin and Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, and Lamer JJ. on the 
legal question; Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ. on the conventional one. 
31  Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 774. 
32  Id., at 775. 
33  Id., at 774-75. 
34  Id., at 784. 
35  Id., at 788. 
36  Id., at 802. 
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quoted Colin Munro’s assertion that “[t]he validity of conventions cannot 
be the subject of proceedings in a court of law [and] the idea of a court 
enforcing a mere convention is so strange that the question hardly 
arises.”37 The majority on the conventional question, four of the six of 
whose members were also in the majority on the legal question, observed 
that courts had, in the past, “recognized” conventions “to provide aid for 
and background to constitutional or statutory construction”.38 In its view, it 
was also proper to do so in this case ― even though this would not be in 
the service of elucidating a legal issue ― because recognizing conventions 
would not entail their enforcement.39 Indeed, the dissenting opinion on the 
conventional question agreed with the majority that it was proper for a 
court to “recognize” conventions, although perhaps reluctantly.40  
In the course of “recognizing” the conventions governing constitutional 
amendment, the majority articulated a general test for determining whether 
a constitutional convention exists, adopting the criteria developed by 
Sir W. Ivor Jennings: “We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what 
are the precedents; second, did the actors in the precedents believe that 
they were bound by a rule; and third, is there a reason for the rule?”41 
Applying this test, the Court reviewed the various instances of 
constitutional amendment that occurred since 1867; found that the actors 
considered themselves bound by a rule requiring “substantial”42 ― but 
not necessarily unanimous ― provincial consent before Parliament 
would initiate amendment procedures; and declared that “[t]he reason for 
                                                                                                                                  
37  Id., at 783, quoting Colin R. Munro, “Laws and Conventions Distinguished” (1975) 91 
L.Q.R. 218, at 228. 
38  Patriation Reference, id., at 885. 
39  Id., at 880 (“[i]n contradistinction to the laws of the constitution, [conventions] are not 
enforced by the courts”). 
40  Compare id., at 853 (“[c]ourts … may recognize the existence of conventions and that is 
what is asked of us in answering the questions”) and id., at 849 (“Because of the unusual nature of 
these References and because the issues raised in the questions now before us were argued at some 
length before the Court and have become the subject of the reasons of the majority … we feel 
obliged to answer the questions notwithstanding their extra-legal nature”). See also Forsey, supra, 
note 7, at 37 (arguing that the latter passage shows that “the three dissenting judges were clearly 
unhappy answering” the conventional question); Forsey does not discuss the dissent’s 
acknowledgment of the propriety of judicial “recognition” of conventions, however. 
41  Sir W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of 
London Press, 1959), at 136. 
42  Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 905; somewhat curiously, the majority did not 
repeat this term in its conclusion, speaking instead id., at 909, of “the agreement of the provinces of 
Canada, no views being expressed as to its quantification”. Surely, that this agreement must involve 
a “substantial” number of the provinces is such a view, if a vague one. 
38 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 78 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the rule is the federal principle”.43 Thus, although legal, and although the 
Court could issue no remedy to block it, unilateral Patriation would be 
unconstitutional because contrary to convention.44 
The majority’s findings as to the contents of the convention 
governing provincial consent to constitutional amendments have been 
criticized as inaccurate by writers of high authority.45 Indeed, one of 
them, John Finnis, has done so not merely in an academic capacity, but as 
the special adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom 
Parliament on the U.K. government’s and Parliament’s response to 
Canada’s eventual request for the enactment of legislation patriating the 
Canadian Constitution. Recounting this experience more than three 
decades later, Finnis stated his belief that the “Supreme Court’s majority 
had made up a convention of substantial provincial concurrence to 
replace the actual convention of unanimous concurrence”,46 although he, 
and the Committee, concluded that the Westminster Parliament had a 
responsibility to enact any constitutional amendment requested by 
Canada so long as it reflected “the clearly expressed wishes of Canada as 
a federally structured whole”.47 Whether these criticisms are valid, or 
whether there might be something to say in the majority’s defence, is not 
my concern here. As Forsey acknowledged, with the enactment of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, “[t]he specific question” of the conventions that 
governed constitutional amendment until then (if any did) “is … of 
merely historical interest”.48 The question that is still relevant now is that 
of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential treatment of conventions generally. 
                                                                                                                                  
43  Id., at 905. 
44  See id., at 884 (noting that “it is perfectly appropriate to say that to violate a convention 
is to do something which is unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence”). 
45  Peter Hogg, in section “Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions” of 60 Can. Bar. 
Rev. 307, at 318-20, 334 [hereinafter “Hogg”] (arguing that the Court’s conclusion was “the least 
plausible of the possible interpretations” of the precedents it identified and the statements of the 
actors involved in these precedents; Forsey, supra, note 7, at 29-37 (criticizing the indeterminacy of 
the majority opinion and concluding that it “is not a very impressive performance”); John Finnis, 
“Patriation and Patrimony: The Path to the Charter” (2015) 28:1 Can. J.L. & Jur. 51. 
46  Finnis, id., at 73 (emphasis in original). 
47  First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1980-81: The British North 
America Acts: The Role of Parliament HC 42 (Session 1980-81) xii, para. 14(10), quoted in Finnis, 
id., at 71-72; but see Hogg, supra note 44, at 332 (arguing that the Report’s conclusion “was 
incorrect” because “Canada is no longer a British colony. It is no longer appropriate that 
fundamental decisions regarding Canada’s constitution should depend upon the ‘best judgment’ of a 
legislative body whose members are not in any way accountable to the Canadian electorate”). 
48  Forsey, supra, note 7, at 26. 
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The Supreme Court chose, however, to return to the conventions of 
constitutional amendment in a follow-up reference, which asked whether 
the “substantial” provincial consent of which the Court had spoken in  
the Patriation Reference had to include Quebec.49 Quebec asserted the 
existence of two alternative (and indeed, as the Court remarked, mutually 
exclusive50) conventions: one requiring unanimous provincial consent  
to constitutional amendments affecting provincial interests, so as to 
further the federal principle; the other, giving Quebec alone, a veto on 
amendments by virtue of its status as a distinct society within Canada.51  
The Court again agreed to pronounce on the existence of the alleged 
conventions, even though it acknowledged that as the patriated Constitution 
had come into effect, and “[i]ts legality [was] neither challenged nor 
assailable”, the matter “ha[d] become moot”.52 Unanimously this time, the 
Court reiterated its endorsement of Jennings’ test for ascertaining the 
existence of conventions. It explained the importance of applying such a 
test by stating that although not rules of law, conventions  
[l]ike legal rules, … are positive rules the existence of which has to be 
ascertained by reference to objective standards. In being asked … 
whether the convention did or did not exist, we are called upon to say 
whether or not the objective requirements for establishing a convention 
had been met. But we are in no way called upon to say whether it was 
desirable that the convention should or should not exist.53 
Applying the “objective standards” supplied by Jennings’ test, the 
Court rejected the existence of either convention alleged by Quebec. 
Although precedents might seem to support their existence (as no 
amendment had taken place without unanimous provincial consent), the 
actors in the precedents did not consider themselves bound by either of 
the alleged rules, and thus, the test’s requirements were not met. 
After the Quebec Veto Reference, the Supreme Court only very rarely 
returned to the issue of conventions in any depth.54 In two cases where the 
                                                                                                                                  
49  Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.J.  
No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Veto Reference”]. 
50  Id., at 801. 
51  See especially id., at 812-14. 
52  Id., at 806. 
53  Id., at 803. 
54  The Court was asked to consider arguments involving conventions in Reference Re 
Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.) (convention 
allegedly preventing a unilateral modification of Parliament’s obligations to provinces under a 
cooperative program); Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, 
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constitutionality of legislation imposing political neutrality requirements 
on civil servants was at issue, the Court took note of the conventions 
imposing such requirements as part of the broader arrangements of 
responsible government.55 This was done in the course of answering the 
strictly legal question of whether such legislation was constitutional ― in 
OPSEU, in respect of the federal division of powers, and in Osborne,  
in respect of the guarantee of freedom of expression in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ― and was thus unobjectionable from the 
standpoint of orthodox constitutional theory.  
Less orthodox, however, were the remarks made by Beetz J. for the 
majority in OPSEU, suggesting in an obiter that “[i]t may very well be 
that the principle of responsible government” ― which is largely a set of 
constitutional conventions ― “could, to the extent that it depends on … 
important royal powers, be entrenched to a substantial extent”.56 This 
seems to suggest that conventions, while perhaps not entrenched as such, 
must at least be taken into account when interpreting the constitutional 
references to the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governors (and 
perhaps other constitutional provisions too), although there is debate over 
just how such an interpretation would proceed.57  
In Reference re Secession of Québec, the Court referred to 
conventions as being among the “supporting principles and rules” that 
“are a necessary part of our Constitution”.58 The “principles”, the  
Court held, “may in certain circumstances give rise to substantive 
                                                                                                             
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) (the drawing of electoral boundaries being allegedly subject to 
convention so as to make it immune to judicial review); and Canada (Information Commissioner) v. 
Canada (Minister of National Defence), [2011] S.C.J. No. 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306, 2011 SCC 25 
(S.C.C.) (the court below allegedly impermissibly relied on conventions). In each of these cases the 
Supreme Court brushed these arguments aside with little discussion. 
55  Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU, [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “OPSEU”]; Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] S.C.J. No. 45, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Osborne”]. 
56  OPSEU, id., at 108. 
57  See Mark D. Walters, “The Constitutional Form and Reform of the Senate: Thoughts 
on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7” (2013) 7 J. Parliamentary & Political L. 37, at 58 (arguing 
that the entrenchment of the vice-regal offices also entrenches the Prime Minister’s advice-giving 
role); Warren J. Newman, “Of Dissolution, Prorogation, and Constitutional Law, Principle and 
Convention: Maintaining Fundamental Distinctions during a Parliamentary Crisis” (2009) 27 
NJCL 217 (same); Fabien Gélinas and Léonid Sirota, “Constitutional Conventions and Senate 
Reform” (2013) RQDC 107, at 116-17 (arguing that the entrenchment of the vice-regal office 
only extends to such powers of that office as actually exist after taking the existence of 
conventions into account). 
58  [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession 
Reference”]. 
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legal obligations”.59 But, while it found support for that proposition in 
the dissenting judgment on the legal question in the Patriation 
Reference (without acknowledging that it was citing the dissent!),60 
the Court also seemed to renew its embrace of the Patriation 
Reference’s “distinction … between the law of the Constitution, 
which, generally speaking, will be enforced by the courts, and other 
constitutional rules, such as the conventions of the Constitution, 
which carry only political sanctions”.61  
The Supreme Court last seriously engaged with alleged constitutional 
conventions in two cases where provincial reforms to the organization of 
school systems were challenged on the basis that, among other things, 
conventions protected the autonomy of existing school boards62 or their 
ability to set local tax rates.63 In both cases, the Court found that the 
alleged convention did not exist. That policy in this area had long 
remained unchanged was not enough to show otherwise. In Catholic 
Teachers, Iacobucci J. for the unanimous Court went further and 
questioned whether any convention can regulate “how a particular power, 
which is clearly within a provincial government’s jurisdiction, is to be 
exercised”.64 In his view, “[c]onstitutional conventions [instead] relate to 
the principles of responsible government”.65 These musings seem to 
flatly contradict the majority opinion on the conventional issue in the 
Patriation Reference, which did not involve the principle of responsible 
government at all, and was in fact concerned with the question of how an 
undoubted power of Parliament (to adopt resolutions) was to be 
exercised. Presumably, Iacobucci J. did not mean to narrow down or 
even overturn the Patriation Reference in this way. Indeed, the 
interesting fact about both Public School Boards and Catholic Teachers 
seems rather to be that the Court would entertain at all, seriously if 
briefly, submissions about conventions. 
                                                                                                                                  
59  Id., at para. 54. 
60  Id. (citing Patriation Reference, supra, note 1, at 845). 
61  Secession Reference, id., at para. 98. 
62  Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 45, 
2000 SCC 45, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Public School Boards”]. 
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III. SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO THE SUPREME COURT’S  
TREATMENT OF CONVENTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s approach to conventions, especially in the 
Patriation Reference, has been strongly criticized ― both by those who 
argued that the Court went too far in engaging with the conventional 
issue at all, and by those who argued that it was wrong to insist on the 
Diceyan distinction between convention and law. There is no room to 
review these criticisms in detail here. It is only possible to make note of 
some salient points. 
One conclusion on which both sorts of critics can agree is that the 
Supreme Court was wrong to count on the efficacy of the distinction 
between recognizing conventions and enforcing them (assuming, that is, 
that it really did count on the efficacy of the distinction, and not on its 
futility). Andrew Heard notes that the Court’s opinion on the 
conventional question “may have resulted in the enforcement of those 
conventions, since it has been widely credited with spurring on political 
leaders to reach an accord”.66 Adam Dodek insists that “[t]he distinction 
between ‘recognizing’ and ‘enforcing’ conventions is a problematic 
one”.67 Indeed, one can safely go further, and say that the distinction 
between recognizing that a rule binds the government as a matter of 
constitutional legitimacy, so that breaching it would be unconstitutional 
if not “tantamount to a coup d’état”, and enforcing that rule, is one 
without a difference.68  
                                                                                                                                  
66  Heard, Conventions, supra, note 4, at 223; see also Andrew Heard, “Conacher Missed the 
Mark on Constitutional Conventions and Fixed Election Dates” (2010) 19:1 Const. Forum 129, at 
129 [hereinafter “Heard, “Missed the Mark””] (observing that “[a]ny pronouncement by a court of 
the terms of a convention can and often does amount to a political enforcement of the convention”). 
67  Adam M. Dodek, “Courting Constitutional Danger: Constitutional Conventions and the 
Legacy of the Patriation Reference” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 117, at 
129 [hereinafter “Dodek”]. 
68  Fabien Gélinas, “La Cour suprême du Canada et le droit politique” (2008) 24 C. du Cons. 
Const. 72, at 77 (pointing out that “la décision judiciaire prise à l'encontre du gouvernement ou du 
législateur est utile non pas parce qu’elle pourrait faire l’objet d’une exécution forcée – ce n’est pas 
le cas – mais bien parce qu’elle est respectée”); Léonid Sirota, “Towards a Jurisprudence of 
Constitutional Conventions” (2011) 11:1 OUCLJ 29, at 42-43 (arguing that there is no substantial 
difference between mandatory and declaratory court orders so far as giving effect to the obligations 
of the state is concerned); Heard, Conventions, supra, note 4, at 223 (stating that “[s]ince the essence 
of enforcement of a rule by the courts is to assure compliance with that rule, the courts may be 
‘enforcing’ conventions even without formal legal sanctions”). Of course, it is possible for a court 
merely to recognize a convention, in the course of arriving at some other conclusion: see e.g., 
OPSEU, supra, note 55, at 45. 
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Those who believe conventions should be left to the political realm 
accordingly argue that the Court should have refused to answer the 
conventional question at all. One complaint is that the Supreme Court 
overstepped the bounds of the judicial role by answering a question 
which, by its own (majority’s) account was not a legal one.69 We might 
call this the jurisdictional criticism. As one of its proponents, Peter Hogg, 
has acknowledged, its strength rests entirely on the acceptance of the 
sharp divide between convention and law.70 But other criticisms, which 
have to do with the courts’ capacity to address conventional questions 
and with the consequences of their doing so, go to the heart of the issue 
of whether that divide should be maintained.  
What we might call the competence criticism is stated most 
forcefully by Forsey, who insists that “[k]nowledge of constitutional 
conventions is not easily come by”, and that most judges and lawyers are 
sorely lacking in this regard, thus being at risk of being misled by 
“plausible constitutional quacks, or authors rich in learning but poor in 
judgment”.71 The competence criticism echoes the idea that 
constitutional conventions are “matters too high for … a lawyer, … a 
mere legist” ― expressed by Dicey himself.72 Andrew Heard’s sharp 
criticism of Canadian courts for adopting Jennings’ test for identifying 
conventions may well support this view. Heard argues that the test 
cannot be usefully applied when the public record regarding the 
precedents and the political actors’ view is not sufficiently clear (which 
is often the case).73 Indeed, in Heard’s view the test is not only 
impractical, but fundamentally misconceived, because conventions are 
rules of “critical” rather than “internal” morality, and relying on the 
political actors’ sense of obligation “opens the door to tremendous abuse 
and damage by the deliberately deceptive and the innocently ignorant”.74 
It is worth noting, however, that ― critical as he is of the courts’ 
treatment of conventions ― Heard does not argue that they should not 
                                                                                                                                  
69  See especially Hogg, supra, note 45, at 321-22 (arguing that while a court can pronounce 
on non-legal questions in the course of answering legal ones, it ought not to address such questions 
in the abstract); see also Dodek, supra, note 67, at 130. 
70  Hogg, id. (noting that had the Court accepted the claim that conventions can “crystallize” 
into law, it would have had to ascertain what the relevant conventions were so as to answer a legal 
question). 
71  Forsey, supra, note 7, at 37; see also Dodek, supra, note 67, at 133. 
72  Dicey, supra, note 2, at 20-21. 
73  Heard, “Missed the Mark”, supra, note 66, at 132-34. 
74  Id., at 135. 
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pronounce on conventions altogether, but rather that they should take a 
different approach to identifying them.75 
As for what can be termed the consequentialist criticism of the 
judicial “acknowledgment” of conventions, it holds that a variety of ill-
effects will flow from such acknowledgment. Forsey warned that “[e]ven 
if the judges state a convention correctly, there is the danger that they 
may freeze it, embalm it, petrify it”.76 Dodek’s language is as grimly, but 
more violently, evocative: “like the land mines that litter Angola, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan, the Patriation Reference’s ruling on the 
justiciability of constitutional conventions has left latent jurisprudential 
IEDs that could explode at a future date”.77 Depending on the critic’s 
perspective and sensibilities, the concern is that courts will either be 
dragged, or project themselves, into properly political debates, with 
disastrous consequences for the politicians (who will be paralyzed by 
fear of overbearing judges) or judges (whose independence and authority 
will be crippled by their stepping over politically explosive issues). 
By contrast, Fabien Gélinas has argued that the Supreme Court’s 
insistence on a rigid separation between the realms of convention and law, 
and in particular its conclusion that courts could not apply and enforce 
legal rules inspired by political practice and values, is untenable. While 
starting with the concession that “the distinction between law and 
convention … amounts to an unavoidable reality”,78 he concludes that “the 
reasons which, in the shape of more or less precise principles, are at the 
origin of the emergence of constitutional conventions on the one hand, and 
of the evolution of unwritten constitutional law on the other, are the 
same”.79 The Supreme Court was wrong, in the Patriation Reference, not 
to allow for the possibility that the conventions which it would go on to 
identify crystallized into legal rules, just as Duff C.J.C. said they could in 
Labour Conventions S.C.C. More broadly, the Court was also wrong to 
imply that the common law of the Constitution had stopped evolving.  
Andrew Heard’s views are similar. He too points to the relationship 
between conventions and principles, noting that the former “are born out 
of and protect the largely unwritten principles of the constitution”.80 This 
implies that the Supreme Court’s position in the Secession Reference, 
                                                                                                                                  
75  Heard, Conventions, supra, note 4, at 227. 
76  Forsey, supra, note 7, at 40. 
77  Dodek, supra, note 67, at 119. 
78  Gélinas, “Fantôme”, supra, note 14, at 300 (translation mine). 
79  Id., at 320 (emphasis in the original; translation mine). 
80  Heard, Conventions, supra, note 4, at 227. 
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according to which principles are part of the (judicially-enforceable) 
constitutional law, but conventions cannot be enforced by courts, is 
incoherent. Heard argues that the courts should give effect to those 
conventions that are of fundamental importance to the constitutional 
order and sufficiently certain, at least “through authoritative declarations 
of their terms”,81 but possibly also by relying on conventions to depart 
from “archaic” legal rules, if only to the extent of “declaring that 
conventions have so changed a particular legal rule that, despite being 
valid law, it may not be actively enforceable”.82 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
For my own part, having argued elsewhere that there is no 
compelling reason preventing courts from approaching conventions in 
exactly the same way as legal rules,83 I too am of the view that the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of conventions in the Patriation Reference is 
indefensible. Indeed, the majority opinion on the legal question, which 
enshrined the Diceyan dichotomy between convention and law into 
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence is self-contradictory.84 It claims at 
once that courts “give birth” ― presumably legitimately ― to common 
law rules, and also that “judicial legislation” is quite illegitimate. It 
denies the possibility of a “common law of constitutional law”, asserting 
that legal limits on the powers of government institutions can only arise 
through enactment, and yet recognizes that some important rules of 
constitutional law are in fact common law rules.  
The majority’s jurisprudential stance might be described as 
pusillanimous positivism ― which simultaneously insists that any rules 
of law that are not enacted, whose existence cannot seriously be denied, 
must have been made by judges, and that judges have no mandate to 
engage in such law-making. This approach condemns a vast swathe of 
English and Canadian law85 ― from Coke C.J.’s opinions in Prohibitions 
del Roy86 and the Case of Proclamations,87 to Duff C.J.C.’s in Labour 
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Conventions S.C.C. to, as Gélinas shows, the future McLachlin C.J.’s in 
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House 
of Assembly).88 Nor can this approach support decisions that explicitly 
recognized sources of Canadian constitutional law that were neither 
legislated nor created by courts ― notably the Secession Reference, 
which invoked constitutional principles (to which Gélinas had sought to 
draw attention), and the Reference re Senate Reform, which relied on the 
notion of a constitutional “architecture”. It seems fair to say, then, that, 
even in constitutional cases, except when asked to deal with conventions 
(and, as Labour Conventions S.C.C. shows, not always even then), common 
law courts have not been so diffident. 
But what of the views of those critics of the Patriation Reference 
who argue that the courts should keep away from conventions? What I 
called above the “competence criticism” touches on a real difficulty that 
courts have in understanding the political environment in which 
conventions develop. But while real, this difficulty is not unique; nor 
need it be insuperable. Judges are not only relatively ignorant, and face 
difficulties in acquiring and understanding information, about the 
political process. “Judicial knowledge deficits”, to borrow Richard 
Posner’s expression, concern all manner of “real-world activities that 
give rise to … litigation”.89 Yet it is never said that judges must refrain 
from adjudicating in the (increasingly numerous) cases where their lack 
of familiarity with the relevant social or natural sciences or technologies 
could potentially be problematic. Judges must educate themselves, and 
lawyers must assist them. The same is surely true when courts are 
confronted with the admittedly difficult questions about the existence 
and scope of conventions. Once one acknowledges, as Dodek does (and 
as the Supreme Court did in the Patriation Reference) that “[c]ourts may 
need to comment on the existence of constitutional conventions in the 
course of adjudicating other matters”,90 one must also abandon the 
Diceyan pretence that conventions are “too high” for lawyers to deal with.  
As for the consequentialist criticism, its strength too depends on 
seeing disputes about conventions as somehow unique, or at least 
radically different from those involving “mere” legal rules. As the events 
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that followed the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the appointment of 
Justice Marc Nadon91 ― relying (correctly or not) on orthodox legal 
sources ― show, legal issues, no less than conventional ones, can be 
politically explosive, and may involve courts and elected officials in 
bitter acrimony.92 And judicial decisions based on orthodox legal 
sources, no less than those based on conventions, can result in 
institutions being undermined ― as that same opinion has arguably done 
with the Federal Courts.93 It is not judicial cognizance of constitutional 
conventions that creates these difficulties, but the existence of a supreme 
law constitution which the courts are authorized to enforce, and they are 
a cost that we have to incur in order to obtain the benefits of having such 
a constitution.  
Now, there may be particular cases where the applicable conventions 
are especially uncertain, or where judicial intervention will be seen as 
unduly trespassing on the constitutional preserve of another branch of 
government, or where no adequate remedy will exist for a court to grant. 
In these particular cases, courts may find that conventional issues are not 
justiciable, or refuse to go beyond outlining the existing rules, leaving 
the political actors to deal with this information as best they can ― just 
as the Supreme Court did in the Secession Reference. Justiciability and 
the limits of judicial power in Canada are topics deserving of careful 
further study. But there is no reason to think that the outcome will be a 
rule of categorical non-justiciability for conventions.94 The Supreme 
Court’s embrace of Dicey’s unjustified categorical distinction between 
constitutional convention and constitutional law was a mistake. 
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